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“I Ask the Profession to Stand Still”:
The Evolution of American Public
Accountancy, 1927-1962
Abstract: This paper traces the emergence of the AICPA as an effective
national representative of the American profession. Central to this
evolution was a broadening of the Institute’s outlook to encompass all
practicing CPAs and to embrace the benefits of public relations and
lobbying. The paper begins with the Wall Street elite that dominated
the Institute’s predecessor, the AIA, and describes the pressures for reform that culminated in the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 and set
this evolution in motion. The final section makes use of former AICPA
president Marquis Eaton’s papers to show how pressure from the
Securities and Exchange Commission, from competing professions,
and from a geometric increase in the profession’s numbers brought
a more pragmatic and aggresive leadership to the Institute, one that
more closely resembles the modern AICPA.

INTRODUCTION
Studies of the U.S. accounting profession’s development
often end with the 1930s, viewing the New Deal, the unification
of the profession in 1936, and the McKesson & Robbins (M&R)
scandal of 1939 as the seminal events in the profession’s history
[Miranti, 1990; Sriram and Vollmers, 1997]. Few emphasize the
importance of the next two decades and the realignment of the
profession’s leadership and goals took place. This paper focuses
on the crucial years of 1927-1962, when accountants evolved
from an insular, divided group with an uncertain mandate from
American society for its services to a profession eager to promote itself and to expand its reach and responsibilities. From
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the beginning of the push to reform U.S. capital markets with
William Z. Ripley’s 1927 polemic Main Street and Wall Street
to the M&R audit scandal, the leadership of the profession
remained aloof from the opinions of those outside the profession. But in the wake of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934
and M&R, a new generation of leaders began to take a more
expansive view of the profession’s proper role. Faced with pressure from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), from
competing professions, and from a geometric increase in the
profession’s numbers, a more pragmatic group took the reins
of accounting’s national leadership, embodied in the AIA, and
began to embrace the benefits of public relations and lobbying.
They were motivated not only by their own vision of a greater
public profile as an essential part of a true profession but by
the inroads competing professions were making into CPAs’
hard-won jurisdictions in financial-statement audits, taxes, and
the burgeoning field of management-advisory services. This led
them to a more aggressive and self-interested stance for the
profession, eagerly seeking out new venues and new revenue for
CPAs’ skills. Beginning with the union corruption scandals of
the 1950s and the promotion of the CPA’s abilities as “business
advisors” in 1962 testimony before Congress by incoming AICPA
president Robert Witschey, the AICPA’s increasingly aggressive
lobbying efforts on behalf of its members showed how far the
profession’s evolution had taken it.
This paper retraces the profession’s path through the seismic shocks of the Great Depression, the New Deal, and M&R
and evaluates the role these events played in shifting the profession’s leadership away from the aristocratic traditions of the
Wall Street-centered elite and towards a more pragmatic generation more in sync with the unique public-private regulatory
model the New Dealers envisioned for the profession. Particular
attention is paid to the efforts of John Carey, a non-accountant
who, as executive director of the AIA and the AICPA, became the
profession’s cheerleader everywhere from his editorial column
in the Journal of Accountancy to the halls of Congress and state
legislatures; to Marquis Eaton, who laid the groundwork for
the profession’s new public-relations efforts and presided over
the name change that finally, after 20 years of resistance from
the profession’s old guard, made the AICPA the official representative of CPAs; and to Carman Blough who, as the first chief
accountant of the SEC and later as director of research for the
AICPA, probably did more to improve the quality of financial
reporting in the U.S. than any other individual in accounting’s
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/8
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history.
The best known and most colorful of the older generation,
George O. May of Price Waterhouse & Co., also figures prominently in this paper. May’s career is in many ways the best
vehicle from which to describe the evolution of the American
profession. He personified the old-world model of the gentleman professional, confident that his professional expertise made
his integrity clear to outsiders and largely obviated the need for
formal regulation. This model proved incompatible with Progressive notions of legal standards of conduct for market actors,
and May’s influence steadily waned after the 1930s. Accounting’s
next generation of leaders better understood the demands that a
nation with an historic aversion to government oversight placed
on professions. This generation (slowly) implemented more uniform accounting and auditing principles and procedures and accepted responsibility for the quality of work of all CPAs. But in
navigating the course laid out for them, the AICPA found itself
defending more and more professional territory, expanding into
new fields, and fighting off challenges from competing professions that threatened its members’ practices. Soon this dialectic
had made the CPA a businessman more than a disinterested professional, and May was one of the few voices lamenting that the
ideal his generation had strived for had been left behind. The
portrayal of May is meant to help illustrate the tension at the
heart of this story, that while much of the paper would certainly
qualify as a Whig interpretation of history, this evolution is what
ultimately led to the profession becoming more self-interested.
The professionalization of accounting, in short, is what caused
the damage to the profession’s credibility.
This paper is in the style of traditional narrative history,
employing archival sources to offer a portrait of the U.S. profession in the mid-20th century. The first half of the paper
describes the profession under the leadership of the national
accounting firms, referred to throughout as the Wall Street elite
because of its clientele’s listing on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). The papers of James M. Landis and George O. May,
combined with practitioner journals, mainstream media sources, and an abundant secondary literature on the New Deal (perhaps the only era of the U.S. profession to have received thorough, critical evaluation by multiple historians) are the bases for
these sections. The heart of the paper are the years beginning in
1939, years that previous historians have largely framed around
the development of accounting principles [see Zeff, 1971, 2003;
Chatov, 1975; Previts and Merino, 1998]. But this was only one
Published by eGrove, 2011
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aspect, and as will be argued, not the most important in the
profession’s evolution over the two decades following the M&R
scandal. The papers of former AICPA president Eaton have been
available at the University of Florida since the 1970s, but as far
as the author can determine have never been used. These memos and letters provide a wealth of information on how and why
the AICPA became just another “trade organization” that aided
accounting firms in “serving their own business interests” at the
expense of the investing public [Turner, 2006, p. 392].
The story in this paper fits neatly into the existing paradigms of the professionalization literature. Accounting historians have made use of Abbott’s jurisdiction model (see below)
and Macdonald and Ritzer’s dilemma of exclusiveness vs.
market control1 to describe the growth of public accountancy in
several nations [e.g., Carnegie et al. 2003; Walker, 2004; Edwards
et al. 2005]. The U.S. offers its own iteration. In the 1920s, the
profession was divided into two national factions along lines
of practice (national firms auditing big business with local
practices providing basic accounting services) and background
(northeasterners strongly influenced by British practice vs.
southerners and midwesterners often of non-Anglo-Saxon descent). This schism left the profession without an authoritative
voice and the two groups merged in 1936 expressly to lay claim
to representing the entire profession. In the postwar era, an
expanding economy created opportunities for other professions
to challenge CPAs’ jurisdictions in audit, tax, and management
consulting. But by this time, a united profession, led by an aggressive leadership, could successfully defend the CPAs’ territory.
THE AIA ELITE AND THE SECURITIES ACTS
Writing of the American legal profession in the early 20th
century, Galambos [1983, p. 488] describes “a profession virtually controlled by a WASP elite, which used its power and status
to ward off threats from liberal reformers and the country’s
new immigrants.” A similar picture emerges in the accounting
profession of the 1920s. Accounting’s dominant voices were
national firms such as Price, Waterhouse & Co., headquartered
in New York and conducting financial-statement audits for the
largest American corporations. Until the M&R scandal, this Wall
1
Macdonald and Ritzer [1988, pp. 257-258] write “…to control the market,
the occupational body must include anyone with a reasonable claim to expertise,
but such inclusion brings in marginal practitioners who lower the standing of
higher-status practitioners.”
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Street elite served as the profession’s national voice.
These men formed the leadership of the AIA, which like the
AICPA was a voluntary organization (In the U.S., licensing of
CPAs is reserved to the individual states.). Until 1921, the AIA
served as the only national organization of public accountants.
Many of its leaders were British chartered accountants sent to
the U.S. to develop an American presence for their firms. In
1926, one-fifth of the AIA’s membership consisted of accountants
born outside the U.S. [see Nissley, 1928, p. 37]. They tended to
favor an apprenticeship system similar to their own training,
rather than the more egalitarian college education prevalent in
the U.S. In many cases, they were also reluctant to associate
with men of southern and eastern European heritages [Miranti,
1990, p. 123]. Most importantly, they did not respect the CPA
certificate, which they dismissed as a state-regulated license
that conferred legitimacy on an inferior class of accountants.
In 1919, the AIA had attempted to secure legislation in Congress that would recognize its membership as superior to a
CPA license. As late as 1926, the AIA refused to limit its future
membership to CPAs [Springer, 1936a, p. 749]. This finally led
to the creation of a rival national organization, the American
Society of Certified Public Accountants (ASCPA), in 1921. This
is the most conspicuous example of the AIA’s failure to exercise
leadership for the profession. At a time when it could have taken
all CPAs under its wing and embraced responsibility for raising
the professional standards of all public accountants in the U.S.,
the AIA instead chose to distance itself from the rest of the profession.
Many small town CPAs in the 1920s may also have found
it difficult to relate to the AIA’s official periodical, the Journal
of Accountancy, particularly to the style of its editor, A.P. Richardson. Durand Springer, founder of the ASCPA, reportedly
“could not stomach the leisurely ways of the elite who in those
days dominated the Institute’s activities…Heading that elite
group was A.P. Richardson, a nonaccountant and an import who
has often been referred to as the epitome of a perfect English
gentleman”2 [Kohler, 1975, p. 27]. After stepping down as editor
in 1936 (to be replaced by John Carey), Richardson [1040. p.
217] returned to the Journal in 1939 with a regular column titled
“This Blessed Language” of which the following passage is rep2
“Perfect English gentleman” was apparently a style Richardson affected.
Alphyon Perry Richardson was born and raised in New Jersey, never attended
college, and worked as a reporter for the Wall Street Journal [O’Neill, 1980, p. 1].
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resentative:
Take...the quotation: ‘Only the brave deserves the
fair’;…as the sentence stands it means of course that
the brave man and no one else deserves the fair. If we
say ‘The only brave deserves the fair,’ we may mean that
an Indian warrior is deserving or that there is no more
than one brave man.‘The brave only deserves the fair’
probably means that our hero deserves the fair but is
not to have her. Now, moving our wandering adverb another step forward, we say ‘The brave deserves only the
fair’ and we imply that the brave man deserves nothing
except the fair. Again ‘The brave deserves the only fair.’
Here we find that the choice is limited. If there be other
ladies present they do not qualify. And, finally, if we say
‘The brave deserves the fair only,’ I don’t know exactly
what it means.
The AIA’s inadequacy as a leadership organization became
particularly apparent in the crisis years that followed the stock
market crash of 1929. Pressure had been building on the profession since the publication of economics professor William Z.
Ripley’s Main Street and Wall Street in 1927, which brought the
issue of financial reporting to the attention of a broader public.
His portrayal of auditors as too-closely tied to their corporate
clients and lacking authoritative standards for financial reporting brought unwanted attention to the profession [Richardson,
1927a, p. 254; Kohler, 1933b, p. 142]. But the AIA leadership
was reluctant to take action. It was George O. May, senior partner at Price, Waterhouse & Co., who saw the handwriting on
the wall for reform and led the first effort to improve the quality
of financial reporting. As early as 1926, May [1936, pp. 44, 46]
warned: “There is not in the profession as it now exists a body
of men capable of dealing adequately with the problem…at the
present time auditors hold office usually at the pleasure of the
officers of the company.” Ripley’s writings spurred May to take
the initiative in reforming financial accounting practices [May
Papers, 57-6; AICPA, 1960]. May would write: “It is becoming
recognized that if the interests of all affected by corporate development – and that includes a large proportion of our people –
are to be protected, it is vitally important that some basic principles of accounting should be established and given substantially
the force of law” [May Papers 53-6, September 11, 1930]. May’s
efforts led to the NYSE requiring annual financial statement audits for all listed firms in 1932 and to the publication of Audits of
Corporate Accounts (1934), at the time the most comprehensive
effort to establish accounting principles.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/8

6

Doron: I ask the profession to stand still: The Evolution of American public accountancy, 1927-1962
Doron, Evolution of American Public Accountancy

117

By this time, in no small part due to the revelations of the
Pecora hearings in Congress, May had lost the initiative and federal legislation became inevitable [Seligman, 1982, p. 2; Flesher
and Flesher, 1986, p. 421]. Inexplicably, though, the profession
was caught by surprise by the 1933 Securities Act, passed during
President Roosevelt’s “Hundred Days” with the goal of restoring
confidence in U.S.capital markets. “Despite William Z. Ripley,
despite Berle and Means, despite the Pecora investigation, despite public demand for reform of the securities markets, the
Institute had made no effective preparation to deal with legislation directed to that end” [Carey, 1969, p. 182]. The obloquy
even came from the accounting academe. Eric Kohler [1933a, p.
164], editor of The Accounting Review, railed against “the inherent snobbishness in many of the Institute’s published reports – a
snobbishness and lack of good taste that have their origin in a
real ignorance of the things at stake in the accounting profession. There is no indication of any understanding of the problems that lie ahead; no appreciation of the newer opportunities
for the profession in the bloodless social revolution in which we
have been immersed during the past year.” After the passage of
the 1933 act, the profession quickly realized its importance, and
both the AIA and ASCPA sent representatives to Washington to
help write the detailed regulations to implement the law [Landis
papers, Folder 2-3; Chatov, 1975, p. 56; Zeff, 2008, p. 177].
Without a unified voice, accountants had been unable to exercise any real influence on the 1933 act. Colonel Arthur Carter
of the New York State Society (NYSSCPA), apparently on his
own initiative, did testify at the congressional hearings leading
up the 1933 act, though it is interesting to note that he reportedly did so as a gesture of U.S. accountants’ independence from
the British-dominated AIA [Carey, 1979, p. 34]. The impact of
Carter’s testimony is unclear; contemporary newspaper coverage
suggests it was quickly forgotten [New York Times (NYT), April
2, 1933, p. 1; Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1933, p. 8; see also Wiesen, 1978]. One reason may have been Carter’s imperious tone:
Sen. Barkley: You audit the controllers?
Col. Carter: Yes, the public accountant audits the controller’s account.
Sen. Barkley: Who audits you?
Col. Carter: Our conscience.
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The pompous spirit of much of the AIA alienated not only
the vast majority of U.S. CPAs (most of whom did not belong
to either the AIA or the ASCPA) but also the New Dealers who
wrote the Securities Acts. James Landis, the chief author of the
Securities Acts and later chairman of the SEC, summed up the
profession this way in 1936: “The impact of almost daily tilts
with accountants, some of them called leaders in their profession, often leaves little doubt that their loyalties to management
are stronger than their sense of responsibility to the investor”
[Carey, 1979, p. 36]. Landis particularly had in mind May, who
had worked closely with Landis in the months after the 1933
act and who had garnered a reputation as the profession’s “philosopher” [Carey, 1970, p. 3]. Born in England in 1873, May was
extremely well educated despite never having attended college,
instead rising up through an apprecticeship to join Price, Waterhouse & Co. in London [Grady, 1962, pp. 9-13; Parker, 2010,
p. 5]. In 1896, he was sent by the British firm to conduct audits
in the U.S. and was one of the founders of the U.S. profession.
Landis [1959, p. 35, fn. 12] felt such antipathy towards May
that a quarter century after the Securities Acts, he found space
in a 20-page law journal article to single him out for criticism:
“Despite the fact now generally recognized that the registration
requirements of the Securities Act have introduced into the accounting profession ethical and professional standards comparable to those of other recognized professions, the then dean of
the accounting profession, George O. May of Price, Waterhouse
& Co. was strangely opposed to our proposed requirements for
independent accountants.” And Landis was not the only one.
William Paton [1981, pp. 91-94], professor of accounting at
the University of Michigan and one of the leading accounting
theorists of his generation, remembers May as “a very conceited
Englishman, and hypersensitive to criticism, even when somewhat justified…his brusque way of disposing of questions he
didn’t like, and his rather domineering attitude toward all those
daring to ask questions, annoyed both faculty and students…I
understand that I was one of only three people who dared to
call him ‘George.’” More significantly, Landis’ opinion of May
seems to have extended to the entire profession. He wrote to
Felix Frankfurter: “I was up the night before and talked to some
accountants…a very strange class of people whom I suppose by
the very nature of their profession are without any humor” [Parrish, 1970, p. 200]. The feeling was apparently mutual. Carey
[1979, p. 35] would remember: “Mr. Landis was not so easy to
deal with. Cordial and conciliatory at first, he became increashttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/8
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ingly critical of the accounting profession. He was a thin, tense,
somewhat impatient man, almost humorless, and clearly feeling
the pressure of his new responsibilities.”
The 1934 Securities Exchange Act, passed by Congress
and signed by Roosevelt on June 6, 1934, created the SEC and
granted it power to regulate Wall Street, including the accountants who audited publicly traded companies. It might have
been expected that without the trappings of a true profession
(one organization representing all practicing accountants, clear
independence from their corporate clients, an established lobbying presence in Washington), the SEC would not have trusted
the profession to handle such an essential cog in U.S. capital
markets as big business’ financial communications to the public.
But such was not the case. Despite the SEC’s lack of confidence
in accountants, the profession was largely left to govern itself,
putting in place a regulatory regime that has since been the object of almost constant criticism from Congress, the media, and
historians [U.S. Congress, 1976; Previts and Merino 1998, pp.
271, 318; Zeff, 2003, pp. 195-196]. As an historian of the Securities Acts concluded: “Nothing jarred the SEC’s confidence in the
accounting profession’s ability to evolve more uniform terminology and techniques. Commissioners and staff members merely
became impatient” [Parrish, 1970, p. 206]. By 1939, Landis had
concluded: “As long as you have the May leadership in the accounting situation, I have very little hope of seeing them accomplish much” [quoted in Parrish, 1970, p. 206].
THE SECURITIES ACTS’ IMPACT ON THE PROFESSION
The passage of the Securities Acts was the single most
important event in the professionalization of accounting; they
legitimized the profession by granting it an exclusive franchise
to conduct financial-statement audits, providing auditors with
the leverage to resist the demands of their corporate clients.
They imposed clear accountability with liability standards for
negligence. As dicussed below, they spurred the unification of
the profession in 1936. And there was near universal agreement
among contemporaries that they improved the quality of financial reporting by encouraging the development of more uniform
accounting principles [Certified Public Accountant, 1933, p. 597;
Smith, 1937, p. 152; Cooper and Ijiri, 1979, p. 36]. Finally, the
acts enshrined a regulatory framework that, regardless of its effectiveness, has presided over the most successful capital market
in the history of the world.
Published by eGrove, 2011
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The experience of the Securities Acts did spur the consolidation of the AIA and ASCPA in 1936. Hostility between the two
groups, based not only on differences in clientele and scale but
on class and ethnicity, had at times reached puerile levels. From
1927 to 1932, the respective journals of the two organizations,
the Journal of Accountancy and The Certified Public Accountant,
rarely even mentioned the name of its rival. Robert Montgomery
[1939a, p. 38], of the national firm Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, noted: “The profession had been greatly handicapped
in its contacts with governmental agencies in Washington, due
to the inability of the representatives of the two societies to
represent the interests of the profession as a whole.” But even
with this in mind, acrimony nearly destroyed the union. As
Montgomery [1939b, p. 72] remembered it: “The retiring [AIA]
president was bitterly opposed to the merger. For some obscure
and wholly unfounded reason, he argued that the AIA would
be diluted in quality and reduced in prestige by the proposed
merger.” Members of the ASCPA pointedly noted that it was
not a “merger” at all. Even at this late date, the AIA refused the
ASCPA’s proposal that the two organizations combine into a new
organization to be called “The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants.” Instead, the ASCPA was “absorbed” into
the AIA despite the fact that less than 3% of the AIA’s members
by 1936 were non-CPAs [Springer, 1936b]. It would take two
more decades of fighting before the AIA explicitly became the
national organization of CPAs, and then only in response to the
encroachments of unlicensed public accountants.
Carman Blough’s role in the profession’s leadership began
in these years. Having worked his way up through the ranks
of state government in Wisconsin, Blough probably had more
in common with the ASCPA than the AIA elite [Miranti, 1990,
p. 153]. While working at the Wisconsin State Board of Public
Affairs, he met George Mathews, a future SEC commissioner,
and, in 1934, he joined the SEC as a financial analyst. By 1935,
the SEC decided a need existed for a “final arbitrator in all accounting problems facing the Commission,” and Blough was
appointed the first chief accountant of the SEC [Cooper, 1982,
pp. xviii, 8]. Carey remembered that “there could not have been
a more fortunate appointment…tempermentally he was ideally
suited for the new job…He was open minded, willing to listen”
[Cooper, 1982, p. xiv].
But while a more affable presence than James Landis,
Blough was a stern advocate for more formalized accounting
principles. He told the NYSSCPA in 1937:
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/8
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Almost daily, principles that for years I had thought
were definitely accepted among the members of the
profession are violated in a registration statement
prepared by some accountant in whom I have high
confidence. Indeed, an examination of hundreds of
statements filed with our Commission almost leads one
to the conclusion that aside from the simple rules of
double entry bookkeeping, there are very few principles
of accounting upon which the accountants of this country are in agreement [Carey, 1970, p. 10].
Carey [1970. p. 11] remembered: “The cumulative effect of
this speech was devastating.” Blough would later add: “Unless
the profession took steps to reduce the areas of difference in
accounting practices the Commission would” [quoted in Zeff,
1972, p. 132]. It was Blough’s hope that the profession would accept the challenge: “I have emphasized at numerous times that
the policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission was to
encourage the accountants to develop uniformity of procedure
themselves, in which case we would follow” [AIA, 1937, p.190].
He certainly had his work cut out for him in persuading the
Wall Street elite to embrace formalized rules at the expense of
professional discretion. As a Lybrand, Ross Bros. partner protested, “There is the idea that standardized accounting is a simple matter, that the only reason it has not advanced further is to
be found in the ignorance or dishonesty of accountants and the
management of large industries” [Warren, 1934, p. 10]. The SEC
received some support for its efforts from accounting academics
when their organization, the American Accounting Association,
issued “A Tentative Statement of Accounting Principles Affecting Corporate Reports” in 1936 [Carey, 1970, pp. 11-12]. Blough
and others at the SEC sedulously pursued improved accounting
principles until the M&R scandal undermined the old guard’s
claim to leadership of the profession.
HOW M&R AND WORLD WAR II CHANGED THE
PROFESSION
The reforms of the New Deal, although initially intended
to bring fundamental change to accounting, had little impact
on the profession over the course of the 1930s. The Wall Street
elite remained firmly entrenched in the profession’s leadership,
much to the consternation of accounting’s new overseers at the
SEC. And however superannuated this elite may have become,
it clung defiantly to the professional model that had seen it
through the decade’s crises. In his valedictory address to the AIA
Published by eGrove, 2011
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in 1937, outgoing President Montgomery encouraged his audience to continue whistling past the graveyard: “We have been
told so often that we cannot remain still, we must go forward or
backward, that we are inclined to believe it. Nevertheless, I ask
the profession to stand still. I do not want it to change” [AIA,
1937, pp. 89-90].
The forces driving public accountancy to become the profession the New Dealers envisioned would work slowly over the
next two decades. The unification of the profession into one
national organization in 1936 was the first step towards broadening the leadership’s outlook to embrace CPAs throughout the
U.S. But it was the M&R scandal and the demands that World
War II placed on accounting that undermined the old-guard
leadership of the AIA and paved the way for U.S. public accountancy’s next generation of leaders.
The M&R scandal was uncovered in December 1938. From
1923 to 1937, auditors from Price, Waterhouse & Co. had been
accepting fraudulent inventory and accounts receivable records
prepared by a convicted felon operating under an assumed
name [NYT, December 24, 1938, p. 4, January 13, 1939, p. 38].
The revelation that systematic fraud had been perpetrated under the nose of the profession’s premier firm made headlines
in newspapers all over the country and led to major changes in
audit procedures. It also proved a major blow to the elite generation’s control of the profession, both to its prestige and to its
numbers, as the practice of relying on temporary workers came
under greater scrutiny and the ranks of full-time CPAs swelled.
It occurred just as the AIA was beginning to take steps towards
the establishment of accounting principles, short-circuiting the
elite’s efforts to placate the SEC [Previts and Robinson, 1996,
p. 69]. In September 1938, the AIA’s Committee on Accounting
Procedure (CAP) had recommended that it be given additional
responsibilities and personnel, “recognizing the existence of
a widespread demand for greater uniformity” [Carey, 1970, p.
12]. The CAP’s work continued after the scandal as it issued 51
Accounting Research Bulletins by 1959, to be succeeded by the
Accounting Principles Board.
The lurid events of the fraud brought the profession unprecedented public scrutiny. Within a month of the revelation of the
scandal, the attorney general of New York summoned leaders of
the AIA to his office to discuss what reforms were needed, and
his office issued a statement that “the Coster-Musica [M&R]
case [has] revealed certain fundamental weaknesses in the
preparation of financial statements of large corporations” (NYT,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/8
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December 24, 1938, p. 4]. The new chairman of the SEC, Jerome
Frank, hoped the fallout from M&R would mark “a turning
point in accounting standards” and called on accountants to
take the lessons of the scandal to heart and begin to accept the
responsibilities the New Dealers had laid out for them six years
before: “Without in any way indicating what the applicable law
and morals may have been in the past, I suggest that the McKesson & Robbins case…raises, for the future, certain questions
with respect to corporations whose securities are listed or registered. While the controller serves not only the management but
also the stockholders, should not the accountant serve the management and the stockholders and the bondholders and other
creditors? And should not the accountant serve not merely the
existing stockholders and bondholders, but all future investors”
[NYT, January 9, 1939, p. 45]?
The profession showed a new sensitivity to public relations
by responding quickly to the crisis. By May 1939, six months
after the scandal broke, new procedures were put in place that
required physical checking of inventory and confirmation of receivables. A new tone could be detected in response to the SEC’s
investigation into the scandal:
Such an investigation might not be proper in the case
of any other profession, but certified public accountants recognize a dual responsibility which is unique – a
responsibility to the client and a responsibility to the
public which may rely upon the accountant’s report.
It was no doubt in the belief that the investing public,
as represented by the S.E.C., had a right to know all it
wanted to know about generally accepted auditing procedure that the accounting profession cooperated fully
in providing the desired information [Carey, 1941, p. 1].
The new audit procedures, as well as the SEC’s issuance
of Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 4, requiring for the
first time “substantial authoritative support” for an accounting principle, helped to end the rules vs. judgment debate that
had marked the profession’s generational fault lines: “The
significance of McKesson, in combination with ASR 4…was to
complete the transformation of an accounting professional’s discretionary roles from individual-laissez-faire driven judgments
regarding principles and procedures, to a judgmental process
directed by peer professional standards, guided by a committee
structure of the AIA” [Previts and Robinson, 1996, p. 76].
Besides making many in the profession more aware of the
power of public opinion, M&R offered an opening to the smaller
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firms that desired a greater say in the profession. At a meeting
with members of New York Governor Lehman’s staff, as the NYT
[January 9, 1939, p. 11] reported:
A number of [speakers] charged that about 90 per cent
of all the brokerage and investment firms, as well as the
greatest industrial firms listed on the Stock and Curb
Exchanges, were audited by six or seven great firms
of which Price, Waterhouse, and Co., auditors of the
McKesson & Robbins Company, was one. With this was
coupled a charge that the officials of these firms dominated the New York State Society of Certified Public
Accountants and the American Institute of Accountants
which resulted in a too lenient interpretation by the
Association of principles which should be applied to
all accountancy activity. Speakers declared that where
small accounting firms, auditing smaller business
houses, made it an almost invariable practice to check
on statements of inventories and of accounts receivable before listing them in audit, the larger accounting
firms, dealing with the books and records of the larger
houses, in general accepted the statements of officers
of the companies audited and put them into balance
sheets without further checks.
The scandal offered those outside the profession’s leadership the opportunity to voice long-simmering resentments of the
big-firm elite. Clem Collins, who had served as president of the
AIA from 1937-1939, observed: “Ever since the matter [M&R]
came up, which is about three years ago, there have been numerous criticisms. When I was president, I received a great
many letters insinuating that there was not full consideration
being given, and that because this firm [Price, Waterhouse] was
a large firm, perhaps they were not subjected to as severe examination and censure as might be accorded to a smaller firm”
[Carey, 1970, p. 40].
Coming so quickly on the heels of M&R, U.S. entry into
World War II saw a perhaps chastened profession respond with
alacrity to the demands of a wartime economy. As the NYT [November 10, 1942, p. 41] told its readers: “Recognizing that accounting has become an indispensable element in war production and in control of the government’s vast expenditures, the
executive committee of the American Institute of Accountants
yesterday announced adoption of a war activities program to
remain in effect for the duration.” As quickly as January 1942,
practitioner journals were advising their readers of the new issues their clients would be facing, from contingencies in the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/8
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face of uncertain payment from government funds to questions
as to whether “accounting reports may be of value to enemy
forces,” and whether subsidiaries of clients now in enemy hands
could still be listed as assets on their balance sheets [Towns,
1942a, p. 270].
The war’s effects on U.S. public accountancy would not be
felt until the post-war era, but their importance should not be
overlooked. The domestic labor shortages brought large numbers of new entrants into the profession. Most prominently, this
included women, although in the 1950s, many firms returned
to their pre-war hiring practices, and women lost many of the
gains they had achieved in accounting [Wootton and Kemmerer,
2000, p. 175]. In addition, the war greatly expanded the need
for tax services. Taxes before the war had affected a maximum
of 6% of the population [Zelizer, 1998, p. 84]. Increased rates of
personal income taxation as well as wartime excess profits taxes
added to the complexity and scope of the tax code and gave
birth to a swelling of the ranks of tax accountants that would
continue in the post-war era as tax rates remained high [Towns,
1942a, p. 374; Perry, 1944, p. 139].
The war also saw tremendous advances in the field of
management-advisory services. The unprecedented scale of
war contracts led to innovations in business management and
recordkeeping. “There is no doubt but that WPB and OPA have
forced many businesses to develop more adequate records”
[“War Has Changed Old Bookkeeping,” 1944, p. 273]. To implement machine recordkeeping such as punch-card systems, the
large accounting firms were often brought in as consultants
[Higgens, 1965, p. 188]. As Perry [1944. p. 139] summarized it:
Prior to the war, the average accounting practice was
largely composed of audit work and preparation of
tax returns, sweetened on occasion by nonrecurring
system engagements or cases dealing with new financing.The scope of services rendered by accountants has
been considerably extended in wartime, and it seems
probable that the success of the profession in handling
these varied assignments may result in a wider field of
practice in the future.The problems of business management have been tremendously complicated by the
network of wartime controls in the face of expanding
volume, and shortage of managerial manpower has led
many clients to turn to professional accountants for assistance.
The dilemma created for the profession by consulting serPublished by eGrove, 2011
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vices will be subsequently discussed.
THE POST-WAR PROFESSION
The end of the war found the profession stronger than ever,
with a younger, more modern generation at the helm. Accounting’s impressive contributions to the war effort had enhanced
the profession’s image: “Many of [our] members occupied high
places in the armed forces; others served with distinction in an
advisory capacity. Washington came to know the accounting
profession better than ever before, and today recognizes the value of services which professional accountants render to the government” [Carey, 1946, p. 1]. The lessons of M&R provided momentum to the two campaigns that marked the sharpest break
from the 1920s generation. The drive for improved accounting
principles, interrupted by the war, resumed in earnest [Zeff,
2001], and a new respect for the necessity of public relations
became central to the profession’s agenda. The combination of
new leadership that embraced the demands post-war America
placed on them, an expansion of the profession’s numbers that
reoriented the national leadership away from the big national
firms, and the challenges accounting faced from competing
professions led to a new AIA (soon to become the AICPA) that
played a pivotal role in molding the profession that exists today.
The AIA’s determination to take all CPAs under its wing, a
process begun with the consolidation in 1936, meant new priorities to meet the needs of its membership: “The influx of veterans
and post-World War II CPAs into the profession…[brought]
a new and much larger generation, more diverse in practice”
[Previts, 1985, p. 84]. Firms like Price, Waterhouse & Co. had
traditionally limited their partnership ranks to a select few, but
the increase in the scale and scope of accounting work in the
1950s forced it to welcome partners from southern and eastern
European backgrounds as well as many younger CPAs more
amenable to the changing times [Allen and McDermott, 1993,
pp. 93, 115].
Perhaps the most important change resulting from the AIA’s
expanded membership was a reorientation to the priorities of
small firms. The AIA’s focus in the post-war era turned away
from the increasingly independent national firms and towards
the needs of small practitioners. While the national firms
expanded to smaller markets and to the international stage,
smaller firms were growing at an even faster rate: “From 1946
to 1966 the number of CPA’s associated with the ten largest firms
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/8
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had jumped from 2,950 to 11,850 – a 401% increase. However,
the total number of CPA’s had jumped from 20,778 to 94,284
during the same period – a 453% increase” [Carey, 1970, p. 356].
Small accounting firms increasingly faced challenges requiring
an authoritative and representative voice as an ever-expanding
set of accounting rules, as well as increased automation and
cost-tracking techniques, placed more demands on CPAs.
Carman Blough remained on the front lines of this battle,
becoming director of research for the AIA in 1944. He would
continue to prod accountants to adopt more uniform procedures for audits and financial-statement preparation as he had
done in the 1930s as chief accountant of the SEC [Carey, 1970,
p. 156]. He did this with speeches and a regular column in the
Journal of Accountancy, “Current Accounting and Auditing
Problems,” in which he clarified technical accounting issues and
encouraged the use of best practices, geared particularly to the
needs of small practitioners.
Carey had taken over as editor of the Journal of Accountancy in 1937, and he was named executive director of the AIA in
1948. The contrast with the old Wall Street elite, particularly his
predecessor as editor of the Journal, A.P. Richardson, could not
have been more pronounced. Richardson’s flowery, verbose editorials, so incongruous in the pages of a technical practitioner’s
journal, gave way to a modest, business-like style. Carey [1954,
p. 33] encouraged a sense of pride and challenged members to
embrace the “social responsibilities of CPAs” and constantly
congratulated them on their progress:
Such rapid growth might have resulted in disorganization…on the contrary, professional organization has
improved…A vast amount of work remains to be done
before the CPA will be universally accepted as the equal
of his colleagues in the older professions, [but] for the
first time, it seems to us, it may be said that the rough
framework at least [now exists]…to complete the structure of the accounting profession.
Carey regularly crisscrossed the U.S., testifying before state
legislatures and speaking before state and local CPA societies.
He wrote Professional Ethics of Public Accounting, hailed as a
“masterpiece,” to placate the SEC’s demands that accountants
formalize their rules on auditor independence [“Tis Not the
Whole of Auditing,” 1947, p. 3], and more than anyone else,
Carey [1949, pp. 3, 5] pressed the need for a greater public profile for the profession:
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When certified public accountants were a small, comparatively obscure group, regarded as technical experts
who could help management and credit grantors in
their work, nobody else bothered very much about the
accounting profession. But now, when auditing, measurement of profit, cost determination, and tax problems are recognized as matters of vital importance, not
only to management and credit grantors, but investors,
labor unions, consumers, economists, analysts, statisticians, lawyers, government policy makers, and others,
the accounting profession suddenly finds itself in a
goldfish bowl…we can’t escape the basic truth that public opinion will largely determine the accounting profession’s opportunity for future progress…[in response]
the Institute has developed a comprehensive public
relations program.
For the most part, CPAs supported Carey’s efforts. State
societies supplemented his work with their own public-relations
campaigns [“President’s Report – 1947-8,” The Texas Accountant,
1948, Vol. 21, No. 7, p. 9; “Public Relations Program for 1951-2,”
The Texas Accountant, 1951, Vol. 24, No. 10, p. 6]. Future AIA
president Marquis Eaton recognized Carey’s service to the profession in effusive terms:
In my opinion it would be impossible for the Institute
to do too much in acknowledgement of [Carey’s] contribution to the profession…[He] is eligible for retirement in twelve years.That date is not so far off that we
can postpose any longer our preparation for it…I have
often heard the question, who are we going to get to
take John Carey’s place? We should get that question
out of our thinking. We are not going to get anybody to
take his place” [Eaton letter , May 5, 1950, group 9, box
3, F.14; Eaton speech, October 27, 1956, G12, B2, F28,
University of Florida Papers].
The AIA’s new focus did not win universal acclaim in
the accounting community. May, now in his third decade of
retirement, maintained a vigorous and often cantankerous
correspondence with Institute officials. “I deeply regret the appointment of an expert in publicity as editor of the Journal of
Accountancy,” May [May Papers, 58-10, 1956] wrote to Blough.
“It seems to me to be an acceptance of the view that the function
of that Journal is to promote the interests of accountants rather
than to give accountants professional guidance.” To John Inglis
of Price, Waterhouse & Co., he continued: “I think it is high time
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somebody protested against Carey’s monopolistic rule in the
Institute” [May papers, 58-10, 1956]. Nor was May reluctant to
share his views face-to-face, as the normally unflappable Carey
[Group 9, B.10, F.73, June 29, 1956, University of Florida Papers] related to Eaton: “I enclose excerpts from some notes Mr.
May gave me when he took me to lunch to criticize my article
in the May, 1956 Journal. I am omitting some of the notes of a
personal nature.”
THE AICPA TURNS TO LOBBYING
A desire to burnish the CPA’s image in the public mind was
not based solely on an idealistic vision of what a true profession
should be. Blough, Carey, Eaton, and others were cornered into
action by the encroachments of competing professions. As lawyers, management consultants, and unlicensed public accountants aggressively pursued new venues for their services, the AIA
felt compelled to push back, reluctantly forced to expand the
CPA’s field of competence and to promote itself in the power corridors of Washington.
Andrew Abbott [1988, p. 2] described jurisdictions (interprofessional competition) as “a fundamental fact of professional
life.” It is through competition with other professions that a profession carves out its professional space. “Control of knowledge
and its application means dominating outsiders who attack that
control…the professions make up an interdependent system.
In this system, each profession has its activities under various
kinds of jurisdiction…boundaries are perpetually in dispute.”
U.S. public accountancy embraced the trappings of a modern
profession – ppublic relations, lobbying, responsibility for all
members of the profession – in response to the efforts of its
competitors.
The most pressing jurisdictional challenge from the 1920s
through the 1950s came from unlicensed public accountants
(PA). In the post-war era, CPAs were generally college graduates
who had passed a now nationally standardized and notoriously
rigorous examination process [Merino, 2006, p. 369]. PAs competed only in local markets and so posed little threat to the Big
Eight firms. But for small practitioner CPAs, unlicensed PAs
were interlopers who threatened their status and thwarted goals
of professional unity. The AIA’s official policy was to encourage
PAs to obtain the educational and statutory requirements of
CPAs, something the PAs, not surprisingly, resisted as pointless,
bureaucratic hoop-jumping [Tinsley, 1983, p. 29]. Although PAs
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had their own state and nationwide organizations, anyone could
call himself a public accountant. CPAs major concern was that
unethical or untrained individuals holding themselves out as
PAs would damage the reputation of the accounting profession.
In the 1920s, state CPA societies pursued regulatory or “twoclass” legislation which would license non-certified PAs then
practicing and prohibit future registration, thus making PAs a
“dying class.” In another example of the AIA’s aloofness from
the needs of small practitioners in this era, the AIA officially
opposed such legislation, hindering the state societies’ efforts
[Tinsley, 1962, pp. 34-35].
The national firms did have substantive reasons for their
opposition. In several states, regulatory legislation allowed only
accountants registered in the state to certify financial statements. This proved a serious inconvenience to the national firms
attempting to serve clients with offices scattered around the
country. Second, several state-court decisions had questioned
the constiutionality of regulatory legislation, suggesting that
it “deprived [PAs] of the fruits of [their] training” [G9, b4, f23,
April 18, 1946, University of Florida Archives]. Finally, as has
been noted, the AIA in the 1920s still had a significant number
of British chartered accountants who were not CPAs, and so
would be classified with the inferior class of PAs under regulatory legislation {Richardson, 1933c, p. 248]. Most likely, this issue
explains why the Securities Acts allowed for audits of publicly
traded companies to be conducted by CPAs or PAs.
In the post-war era, with the AIA’s new focus on the concerns of small practitioners, the PA movement became one of
its most pressing issues. In 1945, spurred partly by the influx
of returning veterans and because the demand for accounting services far outpaced the number of CPAs, the National
Society of Public Accountants {NSPA) was formed and commenced lobbying state legislatures and the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (later the Internal Revenue Service) to recognize
non-certified PAs as equal in status and qualifications to CPAs
[Texas Society of CPAs, 1946, p. 5]. Some PAs even pressed to
abolish the CPA designation altogether [Tinsley, 1962, p. 68].
The NSPA apparently made considerable headway in gaining credibility for its members in Congress. In 1957, the AIA
learned, the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation
inquired of the NSPA “soliciting suggestions for improvements in individual tax forms 1040 and 1040A. The AIA was
not asked to assist in this study. “[The Joint Committee]
apparently felt that our members would not be as well inhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/8
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formed about individual tax returns as the public accountants. Efforts have already been made to disabuse them of this
idea” [G9, B5,F32, memo, “Activities of the NSPA,” October 9,
1957, University of Florida Archives].
It was specifically in response to the challenge from the
NSPA that the AIA finally chose to rid itself of the last vestige
of the old Wall Street elite and change its name to the AICPA
[AICPA, 1957, p. 1]. This had been a contentious issue in 1936,
even threatening to scuttle the consolidation. As Carey remembered: “In 1936, the question of what the name of the surviving
organization should be was naturally charged with emotion
and loyalties…the membership defeated the proposal [to adopt
the name AICPA]. There was some bitterness among those who
favored it” [G9, b5, f26, January 20, 1955, University of Florida
Archives]. The change was opposed because some members felt
that the name AIA had aquired a prestige in business and political circles. But there was another more dubious justification
that suggests the arrogance and inflexibility of the old AIA: “The
American Institute of Accountants is a more euphonious term
than is the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants…
the proposed name is longer, will not make as neat looking a letterhead and in general it will be cumbersome” [Springer, 1936,
p. 632]. Over the course of the next 20 years, remnants of the old
guard as well as inertia kept the AIA from changing its name,
even though “on numerous occassions, members have suggested that the change of the AIA’s name would be very helpful
to them in associating the title Certified Public Accountants with
the Institute’s many excellent publications and public relations
activities. Some members have shown difficulty in understanding why the Institute should persist in its present title” [G9, b5,
f26, January 20, 1955, University of Florida Archives]. But it was
only in March 1954 that the Journal of Accountancy’s subheading became: “Published monthly by the American Institute of
Accountants, the national professional society of certified public
accountants.” Finally, in 1957, the AIA became the AICPA. Eaton
considered this one of his crowning achievements as president
of the Institute [G9, B15, Dcember 26, 1956, University of Florida Archives].
While initially a small-practitioner concern, the PA movement eventually redounded to the national firms as well. In the
early days of the income tax in the 1910s, the legal profession
spurned tax work and left the field to accountants [Carey, 1949,
p. 3; Chatov, 1975, p. 42]. As the complexity and ubiquity of
taxes grew, however, the ranks of tax lawyers expanded, leading
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to a long-running battle with the accounting profession. The
growth of the PA movement seemed to damage the prestige of
CPAs, as the NSPA began lobbying Congress to allow PAs to
represent their clients before the Treasury Department [G9, B5,
F32, May 8, 1957, University of Florida Archives]. The AIA was
deeply alarmed by this development, fearing that lawyers and
legislators tended to lump all accountants together [G9, B5,
F26, “Comment on Dean Griswold’s Speech,” 1957, University
of Florida Archives; G9, B4, F23, December 12, 1955, University of Florida Archives]. These fears came to a head with the
Agran case in 1954, which briefly threatened to restrict the right
of CPAs to represent clients before the Treasury Department
[Carey, 1970, p. 240].
It was the AIA’s fears of the inroads made by PAs and lawyers that persuaded it to take a more active role in lobbying.
It began keeping close tabs on the Washington activities of the
PAs: “The National Society of Public Accountants [NSPA] has
recently acquired some powerful friends in its drive to extract
greater recognition from the Treasury” [G9, b5, F32, October 9,
1958, University of Florida Archives]. In 1955, the AIA began establishing stronger contacts with key congressmen and cabinet
departments with the help of a public relations and lobbying
firm to supplement the efforts of Covington & Burling, the law
firm that had represented the AIA in Washington since the 1920s
[G9, b4, F23, December 5. 1955, University of Florida Archives].
The AIA also established a Washington office for the first
time since the 1930s. The ASCPA, although not the AIA, had
maintained an office in Washington for years, and initially the
office was to be maintained as part of the new organization.
But although many thought it important to have a presence in
Washington, the office was closed in 1937. The AIA determined
that “adequate information and advice regarding legislation and
departmental regulations, and introductions, when necessary,
to Governmental officials, have always been readily obtained
through counsel to the Institute, who are situated in Washington…the volume of activity does not appear to justify the cost of
maintaining the office” [“Closing of Washington Office,” 1937, p.
27; see also Montgomery, 1936, p. 329].
The office was reopened by the AICPA in 1959, but only
with great reluctance. Carey cautioned: “The Institute cannot overlook how its actions may affect its public relations. If
it behaves like a trade union, quarreling over a monopolistic
privelege, it will attract little support and perhaps contempt and
ridicule. This is particularly important in view of present relahttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/8
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tions with the legal profession. If on the other hand it acts like a
leader, shows no desire to punish its opponents or to oppress a
weaker group of people, it may get the credit for a statesmanlike
approach to a problem which is of real interest to the public”
[G9, b4, f23, December 1, 1955, University of Florida Archives].
Carey [1970, p. 436] would also note in his official history that
the new office “gave the Institute a visibility in the nation’s
capital which had not existed before,” although he insists “the
charge to the Washington staff was not to lobby.”
The AIA’s response to the union corruption scandals showcased its new determination to make its presence felt in the nation’s capital. In 1955, a special Senate subcommittee, known as
the McClellan Committee after its chair, John McClellan, began
hearings investigating corruption in trade unions. These hearings, best remembered today for the exchanges between Senate
counsel Robert Kennedy and frequent witness Jimmy Hoffa,
exposed intimidation, violence, and corruption in the handling
of union funds. The hearings showed that a lack of proper financial controls played a role in the corruption – bookkeeping was
erratic or nonexistent, union funds were embezzled by bosses,
and fraudulent financial statements were presented to the rankand-file [Doron, 2009, p. 221]. Among the proposals to clean up
the unions was a requirement for annual financial-statement
audits. The NSPA sent its president, Raymond Jennison, to testify before Congress on the skills that public accountants could
offer, and the AICPA felt obliged to send its own representative
to advocate an expansion of the audit franchise for the first
time since the New Deal. Blough, as director of research for the
AICPA, testified before Congress in 1957 and again in 1959, articulating the profession’s reticence:
The Institute is not a frequent witness before Congress…It has been the policy of our institute up until
last year not to make this type of representation before
Congress on the basis that, if we appeared on bills of
this kind, it would be taken that we were self-serving in
our appearance, that the purpose we had in mind was
to get more work for CPAs. For that reason, we were
very reluctant, for years, to make any presentations of
this type. But about a year ago our executive committee reached the conclusion that this was not a sound
policy, that where fiscal matters were involved on which
we should have specialized knowledge, we should make
ourselves available for questioning and should make
representations, as I have here today, on matters in

Published by eGrove, 2011

23

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 38 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 8
134

Accounting Historians Journal, June 2011

which we feel we have particular abilities [U.S. Congress, 1959, pp. 979, 985].
While the old Wall Street elite would surely have shunned
the idea of involving themselves with trade unions, by 1957,
the AICPA felt it could not afford to concede any ground to the
NSPA. As a result, it offered the services of CPAs to unions that
often had poor financial controls, thereby risking huge new liabilities if any fraud were to occur on its watch. Perhaps at no
other time in the profession’s history has it made such a generous offer in the name of public service, although its motives
were considerably more complex.
By 1962, the AICPA’s attitude towards active lobbying had
undergone a virtual transformation. At a hearing on the needs
of small business, Robert Witschey, nominee for president of the
AICPA, eagerly promoted the CPA as business advisor: “The traditional functions of the certified public accountant have been
the independent auditing of financial statements leading to the
expression of an opinion as to their fairness, and consultation
on tax problems. After World War II, however, it became apparent that one of the most important needs of small-business
management was assistance in areas where the training and
experience of CPA’s gave them special skills.” Witschey further
relates a study that found CPAs were the most sought-after
outside consultants among small business manufacturers [U.S.
Congress, 1962, pp. 113-114]. Gone are Blough’s qualifiers about
the AICPA not wanting to appear self-serving.
THE PROFESSION AND MANAGEMENT-ADVISORY
SERVICES
The growth in the complexity of business, particularly the
increasing reliance on electronic data-processing technology,
helped to fuel the market for consulting services after the war.
For the most part, the profession welcomed the opportunity to
expand its scope of service, hoping “to improve the prestige of
the CPA as an advisor to management, and to increase the reliance of the business community upon the CPA” [Frisbee, 1957,
p. 29]. In no small part, the AIA’s embrace of this field stemmed
from its new focus on the needs of small practitioners. National
firms were developing MAS departments independently of the
AIA, and the concerns about maintaining independence when
performing both audit and non-audit services to a client did not
apply to small practitioners whose clients generally were not
publicly traded corporations.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/8
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Nonetheless, concerns about the impact of MAS on firms
large and small were raised even in these early years. Many
feared that the CPA was extending himself into areas beyond
his competence, and some echoed the cautionary from May that
the “noble obligation” of the independent auditor could be jeopardized “as a result of this expanding service to management”
[“A Talk With George O. May,” 1956, p. 42; on competence, see
“Management Services by CPAs,” 1957, p. 42]. Some also noted
more inter-firm competition in the rush to obtain MAS clients
[Alvin Jennings memo, G9,b10, f77, December 27, 1956, University of Florida Archives].
But what drove the expansion into the MAS field were the
demands of the post-war era. Eaton observed that “many clients
ask for consulting help, [and] are disappointed when the CPA
cannot or will not provide it” [G9, b7, f40, University of Florida
Archives]. This fueled the profession’s greatest fear regarding
MAS; namely, that competing professions would take the work
if CPAs did not move quickly to establish themselves: “We must
give more attention to improving this type of service lest the day
come when we find ourselves doing the hard work of digging out
and analyzing complex financial facts only to find management
consultants and others providing the advice, representation, and
management aids based on those facts” [Witschey, G9, b3, F16,
1956, University of Florida Archives; see also “Management Services,” 1946, p. 5]. Finally, CPAs’ work in the MAS field touched
on the campaign to end reliance on temporary workers as firms
hoped to find more year-round work for staff by securing consulting engagements [Previts, 1985, p. 80].
CONCLUSIONS
Public accountancy in the U.S. modernized and professionalized in the mid-20th century as a result of several forces – government regulation, unwanted publicity from the M&R scandal,
the demands of World War II, pressure from competing professions, and, not least, by the vision of several leaders who pushed
and prodded U.S. accountancy to meet the demands these forces
placed upon it. This evolution was not without its consequences
for the profession. A new business model was created for U.S.
public accountancy in the 1950s, one that aggressively and effectively wielded power in the nation’s capital. The AICPA “and its
generally ferocious lobbyists” became “accustomed to getting its
way in Washington” [Spinner, 2002, p. E1; Stone, 2002, p. 793].
In 1973, proposals in Congress to expand auditors’ indepenPublished by eGrove, 2011
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dence and to create stronger audit committees failed when the
AICPA weighed in with assurances that self-regulation remained
effective [Turner, 2006, p. 383]. Over the next three decades, the
profession continued to fight restrictions on accounting firms’
expanding scope of services, particularly MAS work, and “in
2000, the accounting industry’s potent lobby trained its big guns
on Securities & Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt
Jr. – and blew him out of the water.” When they continued this
strategy after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, “the hardline strategy backfired,” and the profession was shut out of the
negotiations that led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which
“effectively ended” the profession’s self-regulation [Henry and
McNamee, 2003, p. 56, Glover et. al., 2009, p. 222]. As George
May had warned, the AICPA had become an advocate for its
members rather than an arbiter of accounting practice.
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